Newsletter 336 — March 29, 2025

Heidi Burgess and Guy Burgess

FMCS, CRS, and USIP

Before we get into the primary topic of today's newsletter, we want to note three alarming and distressing actions that the Trump administration has taken or is apparently about to take that relate directly to our efforts here. The first was shutting down the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) which was established in 1947 under the Taft-Hartley Act to mediate labor-management conflicts. The second is the apparent planned closure of the Community Relations Service (CRS) which was established under the 1964 Civil Rights Act to handle civil rights conflicts. (We have been involved in two major oral history projects which documented the very impressive work of CRS mediators.) 

Finally, there was the closing down of the United States Institute of Peace. (The link to USIP doesn't work because its website has been taken down.) The Institute was established in 1984 after an extensive campaign by many of the founders of the conflict and peacebuilding movements (including Elise Boulding who we worked with in graduate school.) We have worked with USIP many times over the years and have always been impressed by their expertise and sophisticated way in which they have addressed the world's most difficult conflict problems. Especially noteworthy has been the respect that the Institute earned for their work from Republicans, Democrats, diplomats, and the military. Construction on their Washington headquarters began with support from the Bush administration and was completed under the Obama administration in 2011. 

The mission of all three of these agencies has been to help people resolve intractable conflicts in nonviolent, constructive ways. They have consistently worked to advance and implement the core ideas of the conflict and peacebuilding fields — ideas that we have been promoting  in this newsletter and through the larger Beyond Intractability project  (We are not saying that they took their direction from us, but rather, we have all been working in parallel towards the same end --- the constructive, nonviolent resolution of conflict in ways that wisely and equitably balance the interests of all the parties.)

The fate of these three agencies is, of course, just the tip of the iceberg. The bigger story is President Trump's total rejection of compromise-oriented efforts to find mutually beneficial solutions to public policy problems and international problems. Instead, President Trump is demonstrating through his personal behavior and his administration's actions that he rejects that way of dealing with conflict. Rather, he seems to believe in what might fairly be called the overwhelming force/surrender model of negotiation or, what we have elsewhere referred to as "power-over politics" and "I'll fight you for it" rules.

We know a lot of our colleagues were warning about his authoritarian tendencies before the election, and are probably now thinking or saying "I told you so." But that isn't going to do us any good. The voters have spoken, and we believe in the rule of law and free and fair elections.  So our challenge now is to figure out how to make the best of what is clearly difficult and dangerous situation. 

At this point it is by no means clear how we might most effectively and constructively respond. In this set of two essays, we are going to offer a few preliminary ideas, which we will be adding to over time. We also encourage our readers to submit their thoughts about how to most constructively and effectively challenge Trump's power-over approaches as well.

To us, it seems that the first responsibility of those in the conflict and peacebuilding fields is to help make the larger society understand that, as a nation, we've embarked on a giant experiment — one that will determine whether or not Trump's hardline approach to conflict will actually do a better job of protecting our individual and collective interests. Conflict resolution theory, together with a great deal of conflict resolution practice, suggests it will not.  It seems very likely to dramatically (and maybe catastrophically) undermine the web of relationships upon which our prosperity, security, and true power are based.

We also think that we have an obligation to explain to the public why we believe that Trump's approach is a grave mistake — one that will threaten the interests of his supporters, the nation as a whole, and our friends around the world. We have a voice and we should use it. We should take the fullest possible advantage of the many available opportunities for public input that our democracy provides. These include legal challenges (and support for judicial independence), appeals to legislators, electoral politics, vigorous public information campaigns, and principled nonviolent protest. 

As we do this, our credibility and effectiveness is going to be greatly enhanced by the degree to which we are also willing to challenge the left's brand of power-over politics and its complex apparatus for suppressing and canceling anyone who dares disagree with progressive policies and beliefs. A big part of Trump's success stems from widespread resentment that so many feel toward the left's hardball politics.

In the likely event that we will be unable to persuade the Trump administration to change course anytime soon, we also believe that our second responsibility is to do what we can to help preserve society's ability to revert to a more compromise-oriented approach to governance in the likely event that Trump's policies start to fail and our society collectively decides to change course. This means taking the steps needed to preserve the institutional memory associated with these and other similar organizations that might be discontinued.

While the situation certainly appears bleak at the moment, it also does not seem sustainable. There are deep contradictions embedded in President Trump's approach to governance and in the promises that he has made to his constituents. To paraphrase Herb Stein, "things that can't go on like this, won't." Sooner or later these contradictions will erupt into some sort of crisis — a crisis that will create opportunities for the kind of course correction that we so badly need.

This is the point when our painstaking efforts to explain why more constructive approaches to conflict (and on-the-shelf models for doing so) could start to pay off. Over the near-term, this might persuade Republicans in Congress and some in the Trump administration to make changes that will allow it to more responsibly pursue its goal of counterbalancing the Democrats' overreach.  Over the longer-term (2026-2028), it could provide Democrats with an opportunity to re-earn the public's trust sufficiently to reverse some of their electoral defeats. With luck, we might get both — and a return to a healthier democracy. 

Ashok Panikkar's Comments on "Can we lower toxic polarization while still opposing Trump?"

Great question, Guy Burgess. [We presume he was talking about the question in the title. "Can we lower toxic polarization while still opposing Trump?" which was formulated, initially by Zach Elwood.]

If I might suggest—before we go about trying to address depolarization, it might be useful to explore the following—even if the answers seem self-evident:

1. What is the nature of the society and world wherein this polarization has taken place?
2. How is this society and world different from the one that preceded it (the one that was relatively less polarized). 
3. What would a Theory of Continuity (not change, there are too many floating around) look like. If everybody is trying to create change, everything breaks down. This theory helps us protect vital aspects of the world that are disappearing. 

In other words, we need to first understand the world and the context within which this polarization exists and in which it may even be logical and rational.

As I was saying to another mediator friend just this morning, the beauty of this approach is that it liberates the theorist / facilitator / mediator from being merely a 'depolarization-technician'. He is no longer the carpenter cobbling together furniture, he understands the nature of wood and, if he is diligent enough, may even understand the world. It is only then that we develop empathy—and become more than technicians.

Heidi and Guy's Response to Ashok: From the Stable Peace of the Washington Consensus to the Instability of Today's Polycrisis

Ashok raises three critically important questions — questions that, in turn, raise even more questions about what peacebuilding is and should be in our turbulent era. We share our thoughts below, and invite others to contribute their thoughts to this crucial conversation. 

To start with, we think that it is worth thinking back on the nature of societal conflict during some of the principal periods in our recent history. 

The Post World War II Era

America was certainly much less polarized in the period after World War II than it is now.  The so-called "greatest generation" had just made it through the Great Depression and World War II by sticking together and enduring the kind of hardship and sacrifice that anyone younger has difficulty imagining. This was a time when people understood the enormity of the threat posed by brutal, aggressive, authoritarian regimes. As a result, they were united in opposition to the Soviet Union and China.

They also had much greater confidence that the virtues of American and other Western democracies made them worth defending, (though many went overboard in supporting Joe McCarthy's extreme anti-communism campaign.) This was the "Sputnik era" (Sputnik was the satellite that the Soviet Union put into orbit before the U.S. could, unleashing the "space race.") This was a time when there was widespread support for providing good education, supporting science, and expanding the economy in order to beat the Soviets in the space race, and the larger Cold War with its the terrifying nuclear arms race. While there were, of course, political differences, there was also the unity that comes from having to face such an existential threat.  Perhaps most emblematic of the spirit of the time was President Kennedy's call for Americans to, "Ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country."

The Turbulent 1960s and 70s

This unity fractured during the turbulent 1960s and 70s with the emergence of the civil rights movement, the women's movement, and the environmental movement. This was a time of widespread urban unrest and violence, the assassination of Martin Luther King and Robert F Kennedy, and the disillusionment of the generation of young men drafted to fight in Vietnam — a war that Barbara Tuchman accurately described as a "March of Folly." 

This era was, in a sense, more divisive than what we see now.  There was a prolonged period of large-scale civil unrest in America's cities running from 1964 until the early 1970s that included major riots following the assassination of Martin Luther King. Also contributing to the era's turbulence was the assassination of Democratic presidential candidate Robert Kennedy, widespread violence at the 1968 Democratic convention, and hundreds of sometimes violent protests against the war in Vietnam. 

However, the divisions weren't as clearly along party lines as they are now. The 1964 Civil Rights Act was a bi-partisan effort. It received a majority of support from both parties, though a greater percentage of Republicans voted for it, than did Democrats.  Likewise, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) passed in 1970 with overwhelming bipartisan support, as did the Clean Water Act  in 1972 and the Clean Air Act in 1970. 

Also indicative of the time was the Watergate scandal and the many dirty tricks that Nixon used to secure his overwhelming victory in the 1972 election. Once these tricks were exposed (after a two-year series of investigative reports and public hearings), Nixon lost the support of his fellow Republicans (as well as all Democrats) and was forced to resign.  (This, of course, contrasts starkly with the Republican refusal to acknowledge any of the wrongdoings of Donald Trump—which were considerably more extensive than Nixon's. However, polarization is so much higher now, that almost all Republicans sided with Trump, refusing to remove him for either impeachment vote, and upholding the idea that he won the 2020 election, even when multiple courts, including ones with Republican judges, confirmed he did not.)

The turbulence of the 1960-70s produced major changes that radically reshaped US society —  in addition to the Civil Rights Act, NEPA, the Clean Air Act, and the Clean Water Act, discussed earlier, the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Fair Housing Act, Medicare, Medicaid, the War on Poverty; Food Stamps, the Endangered Species Act, and post-Watergate electoral reforms were all enacted during this period, This legislation has had a profound and continuing impact on US society — an impact that is now a major focal point in today's hyper-polarized politics.

The Reagan, H.W. Bush, Clinton, and W. Bush Era

Disillusionment with the regulatory / welfare state that was produced by the above measures led to Ronald Reagan's election as President in 1980. The tenor of this era was perhaps best summed up by Reagan's most effective campaign slogan: "The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: "I'm from the Government, and I'm here to help."   is presidency was marked by a radical and much more conservative restructuring of the government's role in US society — a restructuring that in many ways is similar to what we are now going through with President Trump. It is, however, important to note that, as radical as this restructuring was, it preserved the core elements of the above legislation.

The next big change came in the late 1980s and early 1990s with the fall of the Soviet Union, the emergence of the United States as the world's sole superpower, and the widespread "end of history" belief that the great battle over how humans should govern themselves had finally been resolved in favor of globalized, liberal (and neoliberal), democratic capitalism. This was reinforced in 2001 with China's entry into the World Trade Organization.

The result was a period of great optimism when Kenneth Boulding's vision of "stable peace" seemed to have finally spread across the planet. (Boulding defined "stable peace" as the situation in which the possibility of  large-scale war was seen as so remote that it didn't really enter into anyone's calculations.)  These were optimistic days for the new conflict resolution and peacebuilding fields when it seemed as if principled negotiation would let us all "Get to Yes", and all peacebuilders needed to do was to help warring parties understand the wisdom of this new consensus. 

While party relations were fractious during the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and  George W. Bush eras, these conflicts largely stayed within the bounds of normal, though still "hardball" politics. George H.W. Bush cooperated with Democrats to pass the 1990 budget deal, breaking his "no new taxes" pledge. He also cooperated with Democrats when he signed the 1990 Americans with Disabilities Act into law. Likewise, Clinton governed as a moderate (he called it "the third way"), compromising with Republicans to get the Welfare Reform Act of 1996 passed as well as the 1994 Crime Bill.

Following the rule that external enemies will unite bickering factions, America came together more after 9-11. Everyone wore American flag lapel pins and almost everyone supported the war in Afghanistan when the Taliban would not release Osama Bin-Laden into U.S. custody.

The unity around 9-11 was short lived, however.  Americans were much more divided over the U.S. war in Iraq, which was perpetrated on shaky grounds and conducted very poorly (especially at the onset). In the years that followed, a wide range of accumulating pressures transformed relatively normal partisan tensions into today's hyper-polarized conflagration.  We'll discuss these factors in Newsletter 337, coming out on Monday.

Lead Graphic Photo Credit: Photo by Joe Loong from Reston, USA - IMG_5453.  Obtained from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Institute_of_Peace#/media/Fi...CC BY-SA 2.0

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About the MBI Newsletters

Two or three times a week, Guy and Heidi Burgess, the BI Directors, share some of our thoughts on political hyper-polarization and related topics. We also share essays from our colleagues and other contributors, and every week or so, we devote one newsletter to annotated links to outside readings that we found particularly useful relating to U.S. hyper-polarization, threats to peace (and actual violence) in other countries, and related topics of interest. Each Newsletter is posted on BI, and sent out by email through Substack to subscribers. You can sign up to receive your copy here and find the latest newsletter here or on our BI Newsletter page, which also provides access to all the past newsletters, going back to 2017.

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